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Abstract
This thematic issue brings together research from political science and legal history about legitimacy discourses covering
different forms of public–private co-regulation and private self-regulation, domestic and transnational, past and present.
These forms of governance highlight the important role of non-state actors in exercising public authority. There has been
a growing debate about the legitimacy of non-state actors setting and enforcing norms and providing public goods and
services. However, the focus of this thematic issue is not on developing abstract criteria of legitimacy. Rather, the authors
analyze legitimacy discourses around different cases of privatized or partly privatized forms of governance from the early
20th century until today. Legitimacy is subject to empirical and not normative analysis. Legitimacy discourses are analyzed
in order to shed light on the legitimacy conceptions that actors hold, what they consider as legitimate institutions, and
based on what criteria. The particular focus of this thematic issue is to examine whether the significance of democratic
legitimacy is decreasing as the importance of regulation exercised by private actors is increasing.
Keywords
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1. Non-State Actors and Different Forms of Governance
In political science, the growing role played by non-state
actors in governing domestic affairs has been acknowl-
edged since the 1980s. With regard to transnational reg-
ulation, International Relations scholars have analyzed
the growing regulatory pluralism mainly since the 1990s
when global governance institutions in which non-state
actors exercise public authority began to mushroom (Ab-
bott & Snidal, 2009; Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; Rit-
tberger, Huckel, Rieth, & Zimmer, 2008). However, polit-
ical scientists tend to neglect that forms of governance,
including non-state actors, are not a recent phenomenon.
Autonomous regulations of merchants that developed
since the medieval times (Cutler, 2003), or the activities
of chartered companies in foreign territories (Wolf, 2010)
are but two examples. Focusing on the domestic context,
research from legal history has shown that private and
hybrid forms of regulation have existed long before, com-
plementing or even substituting state regulation (Collin,
Bender, Ruppert, Seckelmann, & Stolleis, 2014).
To take as wide account as possible of different kinds
of privatized regulatory activities, the contributions to
this thematic issue start out from a broad understand-
ing of regulation. From the perspectives of their respec-
tive disciplines, the authors address debates about the
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legitimacy of public, private andhybrid norm setting, con-
cretization, implementation, and enforcement, but also
of activities regarding the provision of public goods. Dif-
ferent types of regulation are analyzed at the local, re-
gional, national or transnational level. The degree of au-
tonomy that non-state actors enjoy in exercising regula-
tory functions may be assigned case-by-case to a con-
tinuum on which the role of the state is decreasing
and the role of non-state actors is increasing (Börzel &
Risse, 2005, p. 201). Forms of governance that can be
located along this continuum include the delegation by
the state to private actors where the role of the state
remains rather strong, different forms of public–private
co-regulation where authority is shared between the
states and non-state actors, and private self-regulation
where non-state actors take center stage. Against the no-
tion that the state has no role in purely private initia-
tives, we hold the view that there is always some kind of
public ‘shadowing’ because the state or intergovernmen-
tal authorities can—at least theoretically—intervene and
regulate. In that sense, we understand public authority
exercised by private actors as regulated self-regulation
(Wolf, 2014) because it takes place under the shadow
of hierarchy.
2. Legitimacy and the Importance of Democratic
Standards
Examining the legitimacy of institutions has become a
pertinent topic in legal history, political science and other
disciplines. The growing role of public–private and pri-
vate forms of governance—in the domestic sphere and
beyond the nation-state—makes things more complex.1
From the perspective of law, attempts to justify the exer-
cise of regulatory authority by non-state actors have al-
ways been a great challenge. In political science, norma-
tive approaches2 prevail in which certain normative stan-
dards are developed and/or applied in empirical studies
to evaluate the extent to which a given institution meets
them. The literature usually distinguishes between in-
put and output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999).3 Input legit-
imacy refers to procedural standards to secure demo-
cratic rights to participation, transparency or account-
ability. Output legitimacy relates to the effectiveness of
regulation, to its responsiveness or reliability or to the
achievement of goals in the common interest.
Taking up this distinction between input and output
legitimacy, the approach taken by the contributors to
this thematic issue is nevertheless different. They an-
alyze in their respective empirical cases which of the
above patterns of legitimation are actually used in con-
crete discourses around current and historical regula-
tory institutions. The overarching question concerns the
role of democratic standards for the legitimation of pri-
vate and public–private forms of governance in contrast
to output-related criteria. Existing research strands lead
to different expectations regarding this issue (see Wolf,
2017, pp. 63–74). On the one hand, the rise of the output-
oriented neoliberal, new public management and gover-
nance paradigmswith their focus on problem solving and
the provision of public goods leads to the conjecture that
justificatory grounds relating to democratic legitimacy
are diminishing in importance vis-à-vis output-centered
criteria. Moreover, private actors’ epistemic authority,
i.e. their acknowledged expertise or moral authority, dif-
fers from the political authority attributed to the state
and might for that reason alone require different justifi-
catory grounds (see Simmerl & Zürn, 2016). On the other
hand, increasing reference to input-related democratic
legitimacy standards could be expected because of the
extending quality of public authority exercised by private
regulators, including more coercive mechanisms instead
of voluntary coordination and a stronger interference
with state-based regulation.
3. Contributions and Results
The types of privatized forms of governance addressed
in this issue cover the period from the early 20th cen-
tury until today. In the first three contributions, le-
gal historians examine different forms of co-regulation
in the domestic sphere in the interwar period. They
analyze legitimation discourses in the scholarly litera-
ture in Belgium and France (Rudischhauser), Germany
(Collin), and Italy (Cau). The next two contributions pro-
vide a long-term perspective on self-regulatory initia-
tives: Casagrande (2017) analyzes the development of
social clubs, a form of societal self-regulation, in the
province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Balleisen (2017) ex-
amines the development of Better Business Bureaus, a
business self-regulation initiative, in the USA. Moving on
to the sphere beyond the state, the three following con-
tributions by political scientists focus on contemporary
forms of transnational governance. The contribution by
Krahmann (2017) looks at two contemporary cases of del-
egation of authority to private actors as part of the in-
ternational intervention in Afghanistan. Wolf (2017) ex-
amines the public–private co-regulation in the field of
sports, and Dingwerth (2017) analyzes privatized forms
of governance in the field of sustainability governance.
In an overall assessment of the various findings no
single identifiable pattern can be discerned which could
provide an easy answer to the overarching question. The
significance of criteria for legitimacy varies over time and
according to the specific context. Collin (2017) and Rud-
ischhauser (2017) point to the importance of the output
dimension for the legitimation of self- and co-regulatory
regimes in the interwar period. The protagonists in con-
1 See, among others, Brassett and Tsingou (2011), Dingwerth (2007), Bernstein (2011), and Take (2012).
2 Generally, normative and sociological approaches to the study of legitimacy can be distinguished (see Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Peters, 2013; Bern-
stein, 2011).
3 See, among others, Buchanan and Keohane (2006), Dingwerth (2007), Flohr, Rieth, Schwindenhammer and Wolf (2010), and Take (2012).
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temporary scholarly debates emphasized an improved
quality of norms and the superior expertise of non-state
actors. Moreover, the contributions highlight that justify-
ing the exercise of authority by private actors was closely
intertwined with the perceived crisis of parliamentary
systems. In contrast to the three studies on the inter-
war period, the long-term study of social clubs in Ar-
gentina by Casagrande (2017) highlights the use of clas-
sic democratic criteria, such as participation, for legit-
imizing self-regulation. In addition, these four studies, as
well as Balleisen’s (2017) contribution, demonstrate how
deeply intertwined justificatory discourses are with the
specific national normative environment to which (new)
governance initiatives must be linked. Among the con-
tributions analyzing current cases of transnational gov-
ernance, Dingwerth (2017) argues that the importance
of democratic legitimation narratives has declined over
time in the field of sustainability governance. Democratic
legitimation was more important in the 1990s when pri-
vate transnational governance schemes became much
more prominent. They became less relevant when pri-
vatized governance had become more common and ac-
cepted. Democratic criteria are also less important when
the ‘state prerogative’ holds, i.e. when intergovernmen-
tal regulation exists. This finding is echoedby Krahmann’s
study (2017). Foreign interventions in health and security
governance in Afghanistan are primarily legitimatedwith
regard to (expected) performance. This might be due to
the fact that these non-state interventions are already
backed by a strong government, and a net of donors
and international organizations, respectively. In addition,
her contribution points to potential trade-offs between
input and output legitimacy. In his contribution on the
sporting world’s hybrid regulatory regime, Wolf (2017)
concludes that the values used to appraise the state-
based components of the regime do not differ systemat-
ically from those used to appraise the private elements.
Justificatory grounds founded on normative criteria relat-
ing to fundamental individual rights and democratic pro-
cedure donot appear to be diminishing in importance vis-
à-vis performance-related considerations. A reason for
this may indeed be the new quality of public authority
exercised by private regulators.
Next to the expected input- and output-related ar-
guments, whose importance varies in the different case
studies depending on the context, it might be valuable
for future research to put more emphasis on examining
criteria that go beyond this dichotomy for legitimating
certain forms of governance. Such criteria might be a re-
sult of tying justificatory arguments to the specific histor-
ical and national contexts. For example, in his study of
societal self-regulation in Argentina, Casagrande (2017)
highlights the importance of emotional appeals selected
to represent the past. Collin’s (2017) analysis of corpo-
ratist thinking in Germany also hints at the use of such
criteria when scholars emphasize a corporative tradition
in Germany that is thought to match the national iden-
tity. Such unorthodox, unexpected arguments used to
legitimize regulatory arrangements can only be identi-
fied when using an empirical, bottom-up approach to
the analysis of legitimacy discourses, as employed by the
contributors to this issue.
Obviously, context is of high significance for the crite-
ria and standards used to legitimize private and public–
private forms of governance (see also Bernstein, 2011).
This holds true for different national contexts, but also
for ‘world time’. The importance of embedding legiti-
mation discourses in different national contexts is best
demonstrated by the three historical contributions on
the interwar period: In Germany and Italy with their (al-
most) uninterrupted tradition of semi-autonomous as-
sociations and corporations, the debates showed more
openness for corporatist arguments than in France with
its ‘jacobine’ doctrine. The fact that corporatist struc-
tures were anchored in the constitutional order of Italy
shaped the lines of argumentation in a different way
than in Germany, where appropriate regulations only ex-
isted in embryonic form (Collin, Cau, Rudischhauser). The
study on social clubs also shows impressively how argu-
ments supporting self-regulatory practices are shaped by
national history and collective experiences (Casagrande).
The importance of world time is underpinned by the
two long-term studies on self-regulation (Casagrande
and Balleisen) as well as by the study on governance
in the field of sustainability (Dingwerth). In particular,
Balleisen’s study on Better Business Bureaus demon-
strates how legitimation discourses can change over
time. The study by Dingwerth shows how the develop-
ment of sustainability governance has changed the legit-
imation requirements that new institutions face.
The contributions to this issue also highlight the im-
portance of different audiences that may be addressed
by and involved in legitimation discourses. These dis-
courses might develop rather independently, or they
might be linked and influence each other. Audiences
can be located within a single state (see Balleisen’s con-
tribution), in different states, or in the domestic and
transnational sphere (see Krahmann, 2017). This may
lead to contradictions and trade-offs because different
audiences can have different expectations with regard
to what a legitimate institution should look like. The
same argument may, therefore, increase the legitimacy
of an institution with one audience and at the same time
decrease it with other audiences. For further research,
it might be instructive to explore more systematically
different audiences of transnational governance institu-
tions in national contexts where heterogeneous expecta-
tions might exist.
Finally, the contributions to this issue also provide
interesting insights into the role of the state with re-
gard to the emergence of private and public–private
forms of governance and their legitimation. Arguments
in favor of corporatist systems in the interwar period
were closely linked to the limited acceptance of parlia-
mentary systems. A ‘perceived crisis of state regulation’
(Rudischhauser, 2017, p. 13) was the point of departure
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for arguing for a more important role for non-state ac-
tors. Justifications for the latter were related to the de-
legitimation of parliaments. In a similar vein, the emer-
gence of privatized forms of authority in the transna-
tional sphere can be linked to the failure of the state
and intergovernmental institutions to regulate transna-
tional problems. Public regulators are perceived as ‘over-
burdened’ (Krahmann, 2017, pp. 54–62) which results in
governance gaps that non-state actors seek to fill (Ding-
werth, 2017). But the emergence of private regulatory
authority is not limited to areas where such governance
gaps exist. It can also be employed to support the im-
plementation of state regulation. In particular, the long-
term studies by Balleisen (2017) and Casagrande (2017)
demonstrate that the role of the state in legitimating self-
regulatory arrangements can change over time and that
self-regulatory initiatives adapt their strategies as a re-
sponse to changing capacities of and ideas about the
state. The public–private pendulum seems to be swing-
ing over time and will probably do so in the future, influ-
encing how public and private governance contributions
are perceived and legitimated.
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